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ABSTRACT

Comparing the Environmental and Social Factors of UK and US Firms: A Case
for Stringent Disclosure Regulation
by
Jasmine Pybas

Advisor: Michael Lee

Variation in “good” corporate behavior can be observed across countries. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be measured with a quantifiable environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) score, which was developed in part from investor demand. ESG scores are popular among
investors to make sound, responsible investment decisions and corporations to demonstrate their
commitment to sustainable business practices. In a comparison of environmental and social factors of US and UK firms among three industries, the British outperform their American counterparts. The degree of disclosure regulation by their respective financial authoritative bodies accounts for this discrepancy.
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I. Introduction
In 1970, the New York Times published a notoriously influential article by Milton Friedman accusing businessmen of “preaching pure and unadulterated socialism” if they claim corporations have a “social conscience” alongside the pursuit of profit (Friedman 1970). According to
Friedman, a corporate executive functions on behalf of the shareholder to whom they are entrusted to act in accordance with the shareholder’s wishes. The corporate executive is the agent, the
shareholder the principal. If an agent were to siphon profit to charitable causes or enforce environmentally sustainable practices above the required legal standard without principal consent,
they would be functioning instead as an unelected government body, taxing and allocating resources against the principal’s will. This interpretation of Friedman’s ideas have been the corporate orthodoxy, fervently adopted by U.S. corporations and bolstered by lax regulation. Friedman’s orthodoxy, however, operated under the assumption that returns on investments are the
shareholder’s only ask. Fifty years later, the ominous threat of climate change and other global
challenges have expanded shareholder expectations beyond returns. Governments and consumers
similarly seek better social responsibility from corporations after decades of unfettered growth.
Corporations are responding: approximately 20% of the world’s 2,000 largest firms have committed to their own net-zero climate agenda (University of Oxford, Blavatnik School of Governance 2021). Some have boldly suggested that it is now taken for granted that corporations act in
the interests of not only shareholders, but stakeholders—employees, consumers, communities,
suppliers—which have long been deferred in the pursuit of profit-maximization.1 Stakeholders

1 See Bondy, Moon, and Matten (2012) for a discussion on this point.
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have certainly found their place in corporate strategy and mission, but these efforts are not uniform.
Variation in “good” corporate behavior can be observed across countries. In 2021, for example, the asset value of European sustainable funds reached nearly USD 3.5 trillion, far outpacing the USD 330 billion held by the United States (Statista 2022c). There is plenty to be said
about differences between the two continents, but closer examination between the US and the
UK offers valuable insight. As two liberal market economies with shareholder models of corporate governance, the pair have been homogenized under the Anglo-American model. This is “a
pity since, although there are important similarities” between them, "there are also differences
that have not been fully investigated” (Toms and Wright 2005, 267). Their divergence can be
traced to variation in corporate governance which are “fundamentally the result of political decisions” and “are shaped by a mixture of law, rules, regulations and the degree of their enforcement” (Gourevitch and Shinn 2006, 3). This may explain why the UK has adopted a “coordinated
and ‘ambitious’ strategy” of corporate responsibility while the US lags behind (Aaronson 2005,
309).
The Anglo-American shareholder model is often contrasted with the European pro-stakeholder model. It is more accurate to understand the UK as occupying a middle ground. The UK’s
political-historical ties to continental Europe that appear in their sharing of “models of trust and
authority relations” have influenced pro-stakeholder thinking in the UK (Matten and Moon 2005,
334). The US shareholder model appears to a certain degree in UK firm’s “corporate governance
structures” (Williams and Conley 2004, 498). Some scholars call this blend of pro-stakeholder
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thinking with the shareholder model of corporate governance an “emerging third way” (Williams
and Conley 2004). How stakeholder thinking predominantly appears in the UK is through its
regulation. If pro-stakeholder regulation is what distinguishes the UK’s “third way” from the Anglo-American shareholder model, it can be predicted that UK-based firms are more socially responsible than their American counterparts. Corporate responsibility can be measured through an
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score, which developed in part from investor need
for its quantification. ESG rankings are popular among investors to make sound, responsible investment decisions and corporations to demonstrate their commitment to sustainable business
practices. If pro-stakeholder regulation has made UK-based firms more socially responsible, then
higher ESG scores would be observed compared to the scores of US-based firms. Stronger disclosure regulation oriented towards corporate sustainability would account for the discrepancy.
The next section is dedicated to clarifying corporate social responsibility and what will be
used as its metric, ESG factors. What follows is a literature review dedicated to stakeholderism
and shareholderism, which both claim to serve stakeholders best and reject regulation. A third
theory argues for the necessity of government regulation, harboring a deep skepticism for corporate ability to adequately serve stakeholders. An analysis of UK firm convergence and divergence from the Anglo-American shareholder model demonstrates how corporate responsibility is
more embedded within British corporations. An overview of the current regulatory environments
of the US and UK will follow. The aim of this section is to illustrate the degree to which current
and proposed disclosure rules by the US and UK financial authorities (the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Conduct Authority, respectively) enforce corporate responsibility. The next section provides an empirical analysis comparing environmental and social
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scores from the top five (by market capitalization) US and UK-based firms in three major industries. The results support that regulation enforcing higher quality disclosure improves a corporation’s social responsibility. Finally, there will be a discussion of the hurdles facing ESG data as it
becomes a popular metric for investors and companies to communicate their sustainability goals
and progress.

II. Defining Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Factors
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be traced back as far as the Industrial Revolution, but its first appearance in formal contributions appear in the second half of the 20th century
beginning with Howard Bowen’s Social Responsibilities of the Businessman published in 1953.
The concept of corporate social responsibility is an umbrella term under which is a wide breadth
of topics, a reflection of firm’s wide-reaching effects on society. Although development of scholarship dedicated to CSR spans several decades, a common observation is that it is still in an
“embryonic stage”, burdened by a “lack of consensus on the definition of the phenomenon, unifying theory, measures and unsophisticated empirical methods” (Hoellerer 2012, 31). These
shortcomings are echoed across scholarship (see Lindgreen and Swaen 2010; Wan-Jan 2006). In
an attempt to address concern over ambiguity, Alexander Dahlsrud (2006) compiled five
dimensions of CSR and developed a coding scheme to run frequency counts via search engines
to determine global usage. Figure 1 outlines these five dimensions with commonly associated
phrases (Dahlsrud 2006, 4). The analyses extracted thirty-seven unique definitions found primarily from the United States and Europe. Environmental and social elements, while phrased differ4

ently, were equally emphasized and nearly all definitions included all five dimensions of corporate responsibility (5). The results indicate a more universal understanding of CSR where others
have suggested disagreement. Corporate social responsibility has greater utility as a guiding
principle that firms have a responsibility to recognize and alleviate their detrimental effects and
contribute to a greater societal good. The concept as a whole is a rejection of large, multinational
firms operating solely for the purpose of profit at society’s expense.

Figure 1. Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility

ESG is an acronym for environmental (E), social (S) and corporate governance (G) factors which serve as quantitative metrics to evaluate a company’s social responsibility. A firm’s
ESG data is typically sourced from what is publicly disclosed or reported, answers to questionnaires, and/or through direct contact by an investor or asset manager. With collected ESG data,
firms are awarded an ESG rating synthesized by third party providers or an asset manager’s inhouse analyses. Third party providers are the most popular choice, with four dominant compa5

nies—MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, RepRisk, and ISS—producing ratings for 100,000 firms and
400,000 securities (El-Hage 2021, 363-364). Despite its popularity, investors assign “lack of reporting standards and regulations/complexity” as the second barrier to ESG investing, only marginally behind balancing ESG with growth targets (Statista 2022b). Investors, asset managers
and customers all increasingly rely on ESG ratings as a tool to determine a company’s sustainability practices, but methodological disparity and legal ambiguity undermines its utility. In the
absence of regulation, over 100 standard-setting initiatives have emerged since the genesis of
ESG investing (El-Hage 2021, 367). Section VII offers a closer inspection of the diverging data
strategies and the consequent problems it has created for investors and regulators.

III. Literature Review: Stakeholderism vs. Shareholderism vs. Government Intervention
The appetite for improving corporate social responsibility is eclipsed by disagreement
over which framework best serves stakeholders. The main tenet of the shareholder theory, popularized by Milton Friedman in the 1970s, is shareholder primacy, which stipulates that the only
social responsibility of business is to its shareholders. The stakeholder model is touted as a popular alternative: shareholders are stakeholders, and managers should balance their interests and
needs instead of prioritizing shareholders. Stakeholderists misinterpret shareholder theory by
holding it against what Danielson, Heck, and Shaffer (2008) call its current “stylized” version
that emphasizes “maximization of a firm’s current stock price, and executive compensation” (6).
This was not always the case for past iterations of shareholder theory that incorporated stakeholders into its model. Some legal precedents also restrict how far corporations prioritize shareholders at the expense of stakeholders. Still, the current version of the shareholder model, legal
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boundaries included, favors shareholders and incentivizes profit-maximizing. As an alternative,
stakeholder theory has served as an important step forward to the extent that its popularity has
thrusted stakeholders into the discussion of the firm’s responsibility. It is not without its own limitations. Critics like Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (2020) argue that stakeholderism
leaves the matter of social responsibility mostly to the discretion of corporations with limited
government intervention, which is counterproductive and ineffective. At the same time, shareholder primacy continues to bind corporate purpose with increasing shareholder wealth. Neither
position advocates for tighter government regulation, yet it remains unclear how improving corporate responsibility is possible without it. As it stands, shareholder and stakeholder theories
seem unsatisfactory.
Shareholder theory has been refashioned into a straightforward principle of corporate allegiance to shareholders. Corporate law reveals a more nuanced definition. Milton Friedman,
was, after all, an economist—not a lawyer (Stout 2002, 1191). Shareholders are undoubtedly bestowed with rights codified in American corporate law: voting rights to choose the board and approve corporate transactions, as well as file lawsuits on behalf of the corporation (Williams 2015,
45). The legal fiduciary duty of the board is to its shareholders. However, legal scholarship refers
to stand-out cases that reveal a different story of shareholder power than what has been assumed
under Friedman’s shareholder primacy. For example, in Paramount Communications v. Time, the
Delaware Supreme Court ruled in favor of the board of directors for rejecting the shareholder’s
desires to sell the company at an above-market offer because it was against the board’s “wellconsidered views about the company’s longer-term strategies and prospects” (46). The courts
have also ruled in favor of longer-term strategies and prospects made by the board such as deny-
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ing shareholders wealth-maximization in order to pay employees higher wages, as demonstrated
by Ford Motor Company in 1915 (upheld by the Michigan Supreme Court), and Walmart a century later in 2015 (46).
Danielson, Heck, and Shaffer (2008) argue that wealth maximization is inherently a longterm goal—the firm must maximize the value of all future cash flows—and does not condone the
exploitation of stakeholders. This is in agreement with the aforementioned legal precedents ruling in favor of the board of directors: the shareholder model on its own does not expressly go
against the interests of stakeholders. Regardless, there is a focus more on the current, not future,
prices in large part due to executive pay incentives purposefully tied to the stock market to reduce agency cost and align shareholder and managerial interests. This was not always a feature
of the shareholder model. Prior to the late 1970s and after World War II, major companies
adopted a “retain-and-reinvest approach” where they “retained earnings and reinvested them in
increasing their capabilities, first and foremost in the employees who helped make firms more
competitive” (Lazonick 2014). Were the shareholder model to be executed with the goal of future
wealth maximization, there would be greater re-investment in the company and its stakeholders.
Instead, fewer new investments are made, there is a “reduction of discretionary spending (e.g.,
advertising, R&D, maintenance, quality control, etc.), accounting manipulation”, and the adoption of "fraudulent business practices” which all lead to long-term value loss (Danielson, Heck,
and Shaffer 2008, 3). It seems, then, that the primary issue with shareholder theory can be traced
to the introduction of the principle of shareholder primacy. Activist shareholders demand share
buybacks/dividends and managers have stock option compensation, further prioritizing shortterm wealth maximization. The pressure becomes clear when 95% of corporate earnings on the
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S&P 500 have been spent on buybacks in 2015 (Williams 2015, 51). This trend shows no signs
of abating—buybacks hit record highs in 2021 (S&P Global 2021). The misconceptions of the
original premise of shareholder theory and the current stylization accredited to shareholder primacy make criticism of it “both misguided and understandable” (Danielson, Heck, and Shaffer
2008, 1).
Freeman, Martin, and Parmar (2007) summarize stakeholder theory as an articulation of
two managerial questions: what is the firm’s purpose, and what responsibility does management
have to stakeholders (364)? Taken together, these questions encourage managers to consider “the
shared sense of value they create”, “what brings its core stakeholders together” and “what kind
of relationships they want and need to create with their stakeholders to deliver on their purpose
(364). The creation of economic value is the result of the voluntary cooperation in order to benefit for all stakeholders. The authors do not deny profit as essential to firm survival but it should
be the product, not the motivator, of creating value. Instead of pitting the desires of shareholder
against stakeholder, the stakeholder model appreciates the interconnected nature of all constituents. Employees desire well-paying jobs. Customers demand a high quality product. Without
dedicated consideration to stakeholders, shareholder value cannot increase. Because shareholders
are also stakeholders, they should not enjoy prioritization over these other constituents.
Shareholder theorists argue that a stakeholder model presents managers with the challenge of juggling multiple stakeholder obligations, risking an increase of agency costs. Director
monitorship and measurement of agent performance reduces the agency costs that this would incur—a far easier task with stock price as the metric as opposed to tying it to non-financial metrics like employee or customer satisfaction (Stout 2002, 1200). Despite its incomplete gauge of
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company performance, share price as a metric does not compromise shareholder preeminence
keeps and agency cost at bay. Should stakeholder metrics be used to combat agency cost, there is
also the risk of “so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their own agenda, one that
might maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national wealth, but only their
own” (1200). Stakeholderists like Freeman, Martin, and Parmar (2007) warn that this thinking
simplifies a complex reality, downplays daily challenges managers face and subordinates stakeholders. It also encourages managers to prefer an amoral financial perspective of decision-making as opposed to considering moral dimensions that the authors admit already find challenging
to navigate (367). By severing moral responsibilities from business as usual, the “amoral” duty to
increase profit promotes rationalization of self-serving behavior and unethical decisions (367).
Tying ethical values back into business repositions managerial thinking to consider all stakeholders.
Not to be misunderstood as anti-stakeholder but rather anti-stakeholder theory, Lucian A.
Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (2020) argue that “the most effective way” to ensure stakeholders
also enjoy the spoils of capitalism “is by adopting laws, regulations, and government
policies” (1). This is in opposition to the increasingly popular stakeholder approach that advocates corporate leaders to hold sole responsibility for protecting their stakeholders. In their empirical work, Bebchuk and Tallarita reveal the continued alignment of shareholders and the same
corporate leaders who signed the 2019 BRT statement that supposedly overturned shareholder
primacy. This is not surprising given that avoiding further regulation in business affairs is a
strong incentive to appear, but not actually adopt, the stakeholder model. Stakeholderists do not
help their case in insisting that stakeholder, shareholder and managerial interests are aligned (be-
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cause “shareholders are stakeholders”), and the model should be pursued “if for no other reason
than to avoid the folly of regulation and government expropriation” (Freeman, Martin, and Parmar 2007, 366). To that extent, stakeholder and shareholder theorist get what they both want
since “there is nothing to stop corporate performers from expressly providing for shareholder
wealth maximization” (Stout 2002, 1207).
Bebchuk and Tallarita’s primary concern with the stakeholder model is its undeserved
reliance on corporate leaders. Sympathizers of the shareholder model argue for a return to the
long-term perspective of shareholder value which would inherently include stakeholder interests,
so there is no need to scrap it entirely. Stakeholderists believe in doing away with shareholder
theory altogether in order to reunite ethics and business. Neither of these positions, however, discuss how to implement these ambitious adjustments. There are a handful of fuzzy conceptual issues under the stakeholder theory that Bebchuk and Tallarita address, beginning with who counts
as a stakeholder. If corporate leaders are expected to balance the interests of multiple stakeholders, it would be helpful to discern who or what they are. As it stands, what is legally defined as a
stakeholder varies from state to state. All states recognize employees and customers as stakeholders, but others mention either/or local communities, the environment, the economy of the
state and nation, creditors, and society (22). Many states simply have “catch-all” statutes that refer to a nondescript group of stakeholders to be decided by the directors (22). Overall, if stakeholders are generally considered those who are affected by corporate decisions, how does a corporation decide who or what is affected? Despite the difficulty of this task, the statutes and
stakeholderists leave it to the discretion of corporate leaders (24). A second element of stakeholderism requires that managers balance the interests of all stakeholders. “Stakeholders are
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shareholders” implies that the interests between the two groups are aligned which is not necessarily the case. Trade-offs should be expected: increasing benefits to stakeholders, for example
employee pay, can decrease dividends for shareholders (25). To a certain extent, stakeholderists
suggest a legal mandate for firms to balance stakeholder and shareholder interests, but still assign
firms with the task of managing this equilibrium (26).
Why are corporate leaders not to be trusted? Bebchuk and Tallarita use the Business
Round Table (BRT) statement from 2019 as a platform to demonstrate the revealed preferences
of corporate leaders. CEOs at the BRT conference pledged to “invest in their employees, protect
the environment and deal fairly and ethically with their suppliers.” Changes in corporate strategy
involve approval by the board of directors, so any meaningful change would require that they be
in agreement with the CEOs who signed the amended BRT purpose statement. After contacting
the 173 member companies, 47 of the 48 that responded did not have board approval. Only one
had approval by the board of directors. The authors interpreted this as CEOs believing their relationship with stakeholders are satisfactory and that the statement will not lead to tangible
changes anyway (35). A response from JPMorgan stating that the company “operated in accordance with the principles set forth in the BRT statement before its publication, and continues to
do so after its publication” upholds their interpretation (35). As supplementary evidence of apparent ambivalence towards stakeholder consideration, nine out of twenty of companies whose
CEOs are on the board of the BRT did not amend their corporate governance guidelines, even if
it is explicit in committing to shareholder primacy (38).
Directors and CEOs are incentivized to ultimately serve shareholder interests, even if
state constituencies grant them the authority to protect stakeholders. For both, compensation and
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labor and market controls affect their incentives in similar but distinct ways. On average, 56% of
total director compensation is market equity, typically as deferred stock, and virtually all companies listed on the S&P 500 offer compensation in this form (44). By extracting publicly available
non-executive director compensation data from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
all 20 companies with CEOs on the board of the Business Round Table were paid “a fixed-cash
salary, additional fixed-cash payments in connection with committee duties, and an equity
award” in 2019 (45). Similarly, restricted stocks, stock options, and performance-based equity
awards account for 60% of CEO pay. The remainder hinges on cash bonuses based on qualitative
and quantitative performance goals, almost all of which are financial and relate to the firm’s
“profit, revenues, capital efficiency, total shareholder return, and cash flow” (51). Only 2.6% of
companies on the Russell 3000 use non-financial metrics to distribute cash bonuses (51). Finally,
Bebchuk and Tallarita summarize a number of studies confirming that poor stock performance is
linked to CEO turnover, a decrease in future employment prospects, and an increase in the likelihood of activist engagement and settlement (55-56). It is by design, not chance, that CEO/director incentives are intrinsically bound to shareholder value. Higher return value for shareholders is
rewarded with lucrative paychecks and security. Conversely, directors and CEOs face less pay at
best and dismissal at worst should the shareholders find their performance lacking. Stakeholder
value is not a factor in determining the risks and rewards facing corporate leaders.
In sum, Bebchuk and Tallarita reject the stakeholder model as a solution to the shareholder model’s shortcomings but emphasize the need to strengthen and protect stakeholder rights.
Their deep skepticism for corporations to willingly include stakeholder interests without regulatory enforcement is confirmed by their evaluation of CEO/director incentives and corporate pri-
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orities during acquisitions, both designed to uphold the shareholder model by maximizing shareholder wealth at the expense of other stakeholders. Sympathizers of shareholder theory argue that
its original principle, not its current iteration, incorporates stakeholders into its model. It needs
adjustment, they claim, not abandonment. But there is little incentive to shift away from the
shareholder model, and gestures like the Business Roundtable (BRT) 2019 statement is a veiled
attempt to dodge government regulation. Stakeholder theory explicitly reinserts ethical values,
and therefore stakeholders, into the business model that have since been severed by shareholder
primacy. Differences aside, the two theories leave to the firm a complex and entirely voluntary
endeavor of incorporating stakeholders into the corporate model with the interest of avoiding of
government regulation. Without regulation, as it stands, the prospect of success seems bleak.
Generally, firms in the United Kingdom and the United States operate under the shareholder model of corporate governance, aptly known as the Anglo-American model. The model
implies uniformity despite evidence of variation that explains why British firms take a more
proactive approach to corporate responsibility. Some scholars argue that the UK is diverging
even further from the Anglo-American shareholder model to form a “third way”, incorporating
elements of both shareholder and European-style stakeholder models (Williams and Conley
2004, 496). The next section examines institutional investor firms, since they control most financial assets in the British and American markets, to illustrate how the UK diverges from the Anglo-American model. True to the shareholder model, US institutional investors have shorter holding periods than their UK counterparts, incentivizing short term gains. Focus on the short term
leads to a “reduction of discretionary spending (e.g., advertising, R&D, maintenance, quality

14

control, etc.), accounting manipulation”, and the adoption of "fraudulent business
practices” (Danielson, Heck, and Shaffer 2008, 3).

IV. UK Convergence and Divergence from the Anglo-American Model
Convergence between the US and the UK in the Anglo-American model has been shaped
by similar market influences: “stock options as an important part of executive compensation;
market and financial pressures to show quarter-by-quarter increases in growth and profits; and
the market for corporate control” (Williams and Conley 2004, 536). In turn, these market influences can be explained by their joint experience of “extended periods of liberalism, democracy
and regulated capitalism in a mixed economy” (Matten and Moon 2005, 336). But “historically
different models of trust and authority relations from those that prevail in the more liberal USA”
have embedded corporate social responsibility into Europe’s formal and informal institutions
(334). In post-war United Kingdom, efforts to avoid the social and political divisions of the
1930s inspired a bipartisan effort by Labour and Conservatives to form a “tripartite (governmentbusiness-labor) approach to a range of issues from prices and income policy to education, training and technology” (340). Corporate responsibility has been more entrenched in the UK whereas in the United States the issue has been left almost entirely to the discretion of corporations.
The ubiquity of institutional investors provides a lens to demonstrate the different expressions of CSR in American and British firms. US institutional investors hold approximately 80%
of the S&P 500 index, akin to the UK whose investors hold 79% of assets under management
(Shehabi, Sarah et al. 2021). With market domination, institutional investors have the unique
“potential to exercise coordinated collective power” (Aguilera, et al. 2006, 148). The composi-
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tion of the institutional investors inform their approach to time horizons. In the UK, 76% of institutional client funds are allocated to pension funds (55%), third-party insurance (12%), and inhouse insurance (9%) (Shehabi, Sarah et al. 2021). By contrast, 54% of institutional assets are
distributed between pension and insurance funds in the US (William and Conley 2004, 537). The
US market also has a greater proportion of assets owned by investment funds (537). Pension
funds and insurance companies have “long-term payout obligations” and therefore “might more
readily adopt a long-term perspective on the risks and opportunities presented by portfolio companies” (Aguilera, et al. 2006, 150). Investment (mutual) funds, on the other hand, are “assumed
to have a shorter-term investment horizon (William and Conley 2004, 537). Figure 2 offers a visual comparison of these differences. The composition of institutional investors (predominantly
pension and insurance funds) that constitute the UK market encourages a long term view of financial returns and the US market trends towards a short term perspective due to a higher concentration of investment funds. These holding periods are a measure for determining investment
time horizons: shorter time horizon results in a shorter holding period, longer time horizon result
in longer holding periods. The average holding period of a US institutional investors is approximately 5 months whereas the average holding period for a UK institutional investor is 3.4 years
(Wong 2010; Shehabi, Sarah et al. 2021). The current iteration of the shareholder model favors
short term gains, so it follows that US firms would have shorter holding periods of their investments compared to the UK.

Figure 2. “Assets under management by traditional institutional investors in OECD countries”
(% of GDP, 2011)
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Quantitative studies conclude that there is a positive correlation between institutional investors with long investment horizons and higher levels of corporate social responsibility and
engagement compared to those with shorter term horizons (Jo and Harjoto 2011; Boubaker, et al.
2017). Other studies observe that institutional investors with long term horizons tilt their portfolios towards high-ESG ranking firms (Starks, Venkat, and Zhu 2017) and create shareholder value by reducing risks to investments (Nguyen, Kecskés, and Mansi 2020; Gloßner 2019). UK institutional investors are geared towards longer-term perspectives of the market and have less
turnover than their US counterparts, emphasizing shareholder engagement and monitorship with
portfolios to mitigate longer-term risks linked to environmental issues, for example, as opposed
to simply selling shares when prospects of short term gains on investments are in jeopardy
(Aguilera, et al. 2006, 151). For example, the Institutional Shareholders Committee, representing
over 80% of institutional investors in the UK, modified their Statement of Principles for Institu-
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tional Shareholders and Agents to instruct how investors will monitor, manage, evaluate and report in the corporate governance and performance of portfolio companies, intervening when
there are concerns for “the company’s approach to CSR” (William and Conley 2004, 541). The
Association of British Insurers, representing 50% of insurance funds under institutional investor
management in the UK, “seek[s] information on an annual basis concerning the board’s approach
to taking regular account of social, environmental and ethical matters” with the intention of forcing companies to consider their short and long term strategies regarding corporate social responsibility goals (542). Other committees and associations of UK institutional investors have also
collaborated to tackle social issues like climate change (Institutional Investors Group on Climate
Change, Carbon Disclosure Project), corruption and HIV/AIDS (544). While these initiatives are
not entirely absent among US institutional investors, they are fewer in number and much less active (Williams and Conley 2004, 544; Aguilera et al. 2006, 151).
The implications of institutional investor time horizons are important in understanding
the differing levels of CSR engagement in the US and UK obscured by the Anglo-American
model. Differences in time horizons from the compositional differences of US and UK institutional investors expose the qualities of corporate structure that can be more (or less) conducive to
corporate responsibility. Firms with longer time horizons tend to have higher ESG scores because, like the original intention of the shareholder model, investment focus is on the future. The
shareholder model is not incompatible by definition to reduction of future risk because it ultimately protects shareholder wealth. But pressure to deliver short term quarterly profits has pivoted many US corporations away from prioritizing and strategizing against longer term risk.
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V. The Regulatory Landscape of the US and UK
Mandating higher quality disclosure is the first step to tighten loose regulatory threads.
The matter of financial disclosure is delegated to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in the United States. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), similarly to the SEC, is a regulatory body responsible for protecting consumers and investors, and
maintaining the transparency and integrity of the financial market. Voluntary disclosure in has
become a trend that shows no signs of abating: 90% of S&P 500 companies voluntarily disclose
some form of ESG information (Lashitew 2022). With climate change as a global priority and
investors demanding climate-related disclosure to make investment choices, the SEC and FCA
have adopted different approaches to meeting investor needs. The FCA embraces ESG as a strategy to reaching a net zero economy and recognizes the need for financial participants to rely on
disclosure, necessitating “high quality information, a well-functioning ecosystem and clear standards” (FCA 2021). The SEC lags behind, bound by a materiality threshold and struggles over
how to address the complexity of ESG reporting. The ESG scores of US and UK-based firms are
a reflection of the legal stringency resulting from these differing approaches.
The importance of disclosure cannot be understated, and its effectiveness is not without
precedent. Product-level disclosures like the U.S. Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act of 1986 required the release of toxic chemical inventory and a California state law requiring new vehicles to be accompanied by a global warming score created a ripple effect by facilitating the “monitoring of environmental performance indicators by NGOs and interested consumers and investors” and even “changing firms’ internal reporting mechanisms” (Delmas and
Burbano 2011, 79). In support of both product- and firm-level disclosure, a cross country analy-
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sis by Lopez de Silanes, McCahery, and Pudschedl (2019) examines the link between ESG disclosure quantity and quality among countries with varying stringency of disclosure laws. While
they find an overall positive relationship between how much a firm’s ESG information was disclosed and its quality, there were higher correlation coefficients in countries with weaker disclosure law. The US had a 1.3 coefficient compared to the UK and France with 1.1 and .8 respectively (25-26). Where disclosure is voluntary, firms with high ESG scores disclose more and
those with lower ESG scores may not necessarily report. In the UK and France where there are
stricter rules on disclosure, firms with poor ESG scores are legally obligated to disclose, putting
downward pressure on their coefficients. A relaxed regulatory environment skews the reality of
corporate responsibility, making it difficult to enact appropriate policy and hold firms accountable. Mandatory reporting is more likely to produce real change in firm behavior (Christensen,
Hail, and Leuz 2021).

A. The Securities and Exchange Commission
In the context of the United States, the matter of disclosure has primarily been delegated
to the SEC. Although a high percentage of the largest publicly disclosed companies disclose
some degree of ESG information, an SEC analysis revealed that only one third of publicly companies mention climate change in their filings (Lashitew 2022). In a review of 80 small and midcap publicly listed companies, only half provided some form of sustainability disclosure (Martin,
Gez, and Gottlieb 2021). It is clear that companies are responding to the ESG disclosure trends
and demands from investors. But without standards and a regulatory obligation to report, disclosure quality and quantity is inconsistent. As it stands, only a handful of laws under Regulation S-
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K are the extent to which companies are legally obligated disclose environmental, social, or governance concerns. Disclosure is limited to what is financially material, and the current items under Regulation S-K leave to the firm how to interpret and translate the materiality of nonfinancial
factors. It does not help that these regulations are also poorly enforced by the SEC. Because investors increasingly rely on firm ESG disclosure to make investment decisions and complain of
reliability and quality issues, the SEC can no longer avoid addressing it.
SEC Regulations S-K 101, 103, 105 and 303 are a narrow set of disclosure laws intended
to increase the accuracy of financial markets, improve financial transparency and accountability
and reduce conflict of interest (Williams and Conley 2004, 523). In response to recent developments, the SEC modernized regulations items 101, 103, and 105. Put into force in 2020, the
modernization of these items were “intended to improve the readability of disclosures, reduce
repetition, and eliminate immaterial information, thereby simplifying compliance for registrants
and making disclosures more meaningful for investors” (Hitchcock, Rand, and Corey 2020).
Item 101 (Description of Business) requires the disclosure of costs of complying with local, state
or federal environmental regulations. Information provided by corporations in compliance with
the previous version of Item 101 were largely useless and relied on boilerplate disclosures stating
environmental regulations would have no financial cost. It has since been expanded to require
“principle-based” disclosure “information material to an understanding of the general development of the business” (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2020; hereafter SEC). Multiple studies conclude that what firms disclose in compliance with Item 101(xiii) to describe how
environmental regulation will affect financial costs has been “utterly uninformative” (Williams
and Conley 2004, 525). While the expansion improves flexibility, it will not be more effective

21

than what is already in place. Under Item 103 (Legal Proceedings), environmental litigation need
not be disclosed unless sanctions are expected to be $300,000 or over, an increase from
$100,000. An EPA study concluded that three out of every four publicly traded companies violated Item 103, and SEC enforcement only one case over the last twenty years (Aaronson 2003,
328; Williams and Conley 2004, 525). Item 303 is a more general regulation requiring companies
to disclose “events, trends, or contingencies” that would have an impact on future finances (524).
Williams and Conley (2004) argue that in theory, these items should inspire some degree of environmental or social accountability but the reality proves otherwise. The amendment to Item 105
(Risk Factors) replaces the disclosure to include “most significant” risks to those that are only
material, and for the “Risk Factors” section of the financial statement to include a 2-page summary if it exceeds 15 pages (Hitchcock, Rand, and Corey 2020). Item 303, if interpreted broadly
enough to include social and environmental issues as significant factors causing potential financial risks, could have advanced these issues to the forefront of corporate asset protection and
strategy—but according to Williams and Conley, this has not caught on (Williams and Conley
2004, 526). Broad regulations like Items 101, 103, and 303 that are subject to interpretation provides strong incentive to downplay or deny social/environmental impacts on financial returns,
especially since the SEC signals its unwillingness to enforce their own rules as demonstrated
with Item 103.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was a government reaction to the Enron/Worldcom scandals to reel in poor governance. Investors lost confidence in public company’s abilities
to report all debts and losses after a whistleblower revealed corporations have been obscuring
loss and debt with dubious accounting (Legal Information Institute, n.d.). Williams and Conley
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(2004) predicted three years after its bipartisan passage through Congress that the new disclosure
requirements set forth by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are still not on par with those already in effect
in the EU and UK (526). More recent assessments of SOX validates William and Conley’s prediction of inadequacy: in 2021, the effects of SOX are inconclusive (Meyer 2021, 611).
Some SEC regulations have even discouraged corporate social responsibility. For example, current SEC regulations within their Full Disclosure System prohibit “inside” conversations
among shareholders by requiring that they be made quickly available to the public, greatly inhibiting the collaborative, consultative process more prevalent in the UK (Aguilera, et al. 2006,
151). Aguilera, et al. (2006) expressed hope that certain rule amendments under SEC consideration at the time would expand the voting power of minority shareholders (those with 3% of company equity) to nominate directors. A similar sentiment was shared by Williams and Conley
(2004), pointing to proxy voting as another means of incorporating stakeholder interests into
corporate governance. In 2020, however, the SEC announced new shareholder proposal rules,
increasing the minimum of shares and number of years these shares must be held for qualifying
shareholders submit proposals. This was a major setback for democratizing corporate governance
to include the concerns of minority shareholders, whose proposals primarily “raise[d] significant
questions regarding the environmental and social impacts of corporate policies and practices, or
governance best practices, with a focus on risk and long-term sustainability” (McDermott 2020).
In order to protect investors, the SEC requires companies to be transparent about risks
and anything financially material to the health of their business. Is ESG financially relevant to
investors? If so, to what extent? The breadth of ESG, unreliable data management, and questions
over authoritative boundaries have made it a challenge to justify and frame enforcement. Disclo-
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sure mandates within the European Union were a response to promulgation by the European Parliament and are consistent with the bloc’s policy embrace of UN Sustainability Goals (Rose
2021, 28). By contrast, the SEC’s engagement with ESG policy is "without predicate acts by political bodies endorsing the substantive ends sought” (29). Without political guidance, the SEC
has attempted to frame the ESG question within the parameters of its jurisdiction to protect investor rights and maintain market efficiency. The Commission’s disclosure rules are limited to
materiality, a benchmark that requires only relevant financial information be released to investors. How ESG factors are financially relevant to investors is not necessarily intuitive. In a
speech at the National Investor Relations Institute in 2021, Former Commissioner Elad L. Roisman expressed his reservations about bringing ESG into the realm of materiality:

We have to look at the issue through our own three-part mission and assess how the types
of information other standards require companies to report, such as greenhouse gas emissions, are material to investors. If such information is relevant primarily for purposes of a
climate-focused goal, then I question how the SEC is the appropriate agency to undertake
requiring its disclosure. The U.S. has other federal regulators (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency) with mandates and expertise to address these issues. […] To the extent that
there are issues included within the ESG umbrella that remain contested among American
voters, I believe that such debates are properly and appropriately held amongst Americans’ elected officials, either at the state or federal level (SEC 2021).

In the pursuit of clarity, the SEC sought public comment on what information regarding sustainability or public policy matters were material “‘to an understanding of a registrant’s business and
financial condition and whether there are other considerations that make these disclosures important to investment and voting decisions’” (Rose 2021, 9). The 25,000 submitted comments were
a mixed bag of concern and support (9). An oft-cited petition submitted in 2018 by Professors
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Cynthia Williams and Jill Fisch urges the SEC to begin crafting a framework for publicly listed
companies to disclose ESG information. The petition was signed and endorsed by investors and
organizations representing $5 trillion in assets under management (10). The two initiatives did
not concretize more technical questions about how to report ESG factors, but they did prove irrefutable investor interest. Williams and Fisch are perhaps right to suggest that alone is sufficiently material.
Despite Former Commissioner Roisman’s ambivalence, SEC Chair Gary Gensler has expressed support for the recently proposed rules that would require disclosure for funds claiming
to have an ESG focus (SEC 2022b). The Biden administration has also made strides to rejoining
the Paris Accord and the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act that will invest over $369 million in climate change (Earthjustice 2022). Roisman’s suggestion to delegate ESG matters to the
Environmental Protection Agency comes just months before a Supreme Court ruling imposed
limits on the its authority to regulate the energy sector. Unfortunately for Roisman, this ruling
make it difficult to justify the EPA’s authority on climate disclosure. The SEC has reacted to investor concerns and understands the risk to the market of allowing ESG disclosure to go unstandardized. The modernization to Regulation S-K, however, only attempted to specify materially
relevant climate disclosure. While the modernization effort was a pragmatic adjustment to the
language of the regulations, it does little to address how firms report to investors (Ho 2020, 69).
In this way, the SEC seems to misinterpret investor concerns due to their concern of overstepping
their authority boundaries. It is unclear how the proposed rules will fulfill investor needs, or if
they will simply be blocked due to overreach. Even if these developments were to come to
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fruition, it would still put the SEC behind the progress already made by the various departments
that have financial authority in the UK government.
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Table 1. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Current Disclosure Regulations
(applies to all domestic publicly listed firms)
Regulation S-K

Item Summary

Item 101 (Description of business)

Principle/narrative-based description of the general
development of the registrant’s business (Rosner, et
al.).

Item 103 (Legal proceedings)

“Disclosure of material pending legal proceedings”
and; “disclosure of any proceeding under environmental laws […] unless the proceeding will result in
monetary sanctions of [$300,000]” (Rosner, et al.
2020)

Item 105 (Risk factors)

Requires the “disclosure of ‘material’ risks (i.e., those
matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable investor would attach importance in
connection with an investment decision)” (Rosner, et
al. 2020)

Item 303 (Management's discussion and analysis of
financial condition and results of operations)

Discussion and analysis of material information relevant to the financial condition of the company, including events and uncertainty known to management
and financial/statistical data helpful to the understanding of the company financial condition (Handy
and Joseph 2021).

Proposed Regulations
Firms must disclose:
(1) “[T]he registrant’s governance of climate-related risks and relevant risk management processes;”
(2) “[H]ow any climate-related risks identified by the registrant have had or are likely to have a material impact
on its business and consolidated financial statements, which may manifest over the short-, medium-, or longterm;”
(3) “[H]ow any identified climate-related risks have aﬀected or are likely to aﬀect the registrant’s strategy, business model, and outlook; and[…]”
(4) “[T]he impact of climate-related events (severe weather events and other natural conditions) […] (SEC
2022a).”
Disclosure of greenhouse (GHG) emissions if firm falls into any of the three scopes:
Scope 1

“Disclose direct greenhouse gas emissions”;

Scope 2

“Disclose indirect emissions from purchased electricity or other forms of energy”;

Scope 3

“Disclose if material or if the registrant has set a GHG
emissions target or goal” (SEC 2022a)
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B. UK Parliament and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
Alongside its current initiatives, the UK has a history of corporate responsibility practices
and committees that produced the Companies Act 2006, formally requiring that a firm’s annual
report “must contain an explanation of how the company is managing issues such as environmental performance, human rights, social and community involvement and diversity including
gender diversity at Board, senior management and whole-company levels” (May and Jones). In
the early 1990’s through the early 2000’s, several independent committees formed to compile
recommendations “about accounting practices, executive compensation, board composition, and
expanded non-financial disclosure” (William and Conley 2004, 511). For example, over concern
of accounting scandals committed by Maxwell Communications and Polly Peck Company, the
Cadbury Committee (1992) focused on the importance of auditor independence and “enhancing
the supervisory role of the non-executive members of the board of directors” (512). Other recommendations were to separate the role of the CEO and the Director of the Board and have a
certain proportion of directors be external from the company (Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos
2002, 461-462). Following Cadbury, the Greenbury Committee (1995) centered on the issue of
executive compensation, disapproving “American style stock options” as pay incentives and
suggesting instead that executive pay raises be on par with other lower-tier employees of the
company (William and Conley 2004, 512). In 1999, the Turnbull Committee established that effective internal corporate control must consider other sources of risks, “including legal, health,
safety and environmental, reputation, and business probity issues” (514). Altogether, these committees and others contributed to a greater focus in the business community on matters of corporate governance improvements and transparency, and encouraged consideration of non-financial
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risks. In response to their formation, the British government began the Company Law Review to
implement committee recommendations into law, resulting in the Companies Act 2006 (511).
Under section 172 codified in the Companies Act 2006, “Director’s Duties,” the Director
is required to regard “the interests of the company’s employees”, “the need to foster […] relationships with suppliers, customers and others”, “the impact of the company’s operations on the
community and the environment” in promoting the success of the firm (Chivers 2007, 6). How
the Director has complied with his or her duties is revealed in the business review. The business
review under section 417 of the Act is to “inform members of the company and help them assess
how the directors have performed their duty under section 172 (duty to promote the success of
the company)” (Companies Act 2006). In addition to disclosing the financial health of the company including risks and performance, the business review must include information about “(i)
environmental matters (including the impact of the company's business on the environment), (ii)
the company's employees, and (iii) social and community issues, including information about
any policies of the company in relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those
policies” (Companies Act 2006). An analysis using key performance indicators related to environmental and employee matters should be used to assist in the understanding of the company’s
position and performance (Companies Act 2006).
The UK government’s continued commitment to improving CSR continues with its recent efforts to include regulations into the Act that it was almost obligated to follow under the
EU’s jurisdiction. Inspired in part by EU rules and after a consultative period by the UK’s Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Parliament amended the Companies Act
2006 to include Companies (Strategic Report) (Climate-related Financial Disclosure) Regula-
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tions 2022 (“CFD Regulations”), mandating firms to disclose climate-related financial information in line with recommendations from the Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosure (TCFD).
The TCFD was designed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international body. Since
April 2022, these rules have applied to 1,300 of the largest companies in the UK, including traded companies, banks, insurers, and private companies with 500 employees or £500 million in
turnover (Morales 2021). The requirements will continue to phase in smaller firms until 2025,
which would make it the first country in the world to make disclosure mandatory across its entire
economy (FCA 2021). The TCFD is a key element to the UK regulation that sets it apart from the
SEC. The TCFD was designed by the FSB to “develop consistent climate-related financial risk
disclosures for use by companies, banks, and investors in providing information to
stakeholders” (United Nations Environment Programme - Finance Initiative n.d.). Under the
CFD Regulations, firms are to report by the recommendations under four core elements (governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets) published by the TCFD. It is designed
to be adapted for all firms to submit in their financial filings, focus on what is relevant and provide appropriate metrics in an effort to replace independent reports with something mainstream.
Upcoming regulations will apply to asset managers, who will also have to base their financial
reports on the TCFD accompanied with a taxonomy system that classifies investments on a sustainability scale.
UK firms and committees have spent earlier decades engaging the business community
regarding stakeholder consideration and sound corporate governance practices. Their recommendations became law with the passing of the Companies Act 2006. The Act, even before the CFD
Regulations, requires that directors consider employees, the environment, relationships with sup-
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pliers and customers as integral to the success of the company. To ensure follow-through, a business review detailing the fulfillment of the Director’s duties is required. The amendments made
to the Act was a relatively smooth process compared to the “modernization” of a few SEC regulatory items. This can be explained, in part, by Parliament’s embrace of the committees early on,
signifying a comfortable relationship between business and government that is not a feature in
the American context (Albareda, Lozano, and Ysa 2007, 393). The SEC’s modernization of Regulation S-K essentially cleaned up regulatory language and does not target reporting standards
that have caused confusion among investors. Regulation S-K neither explicitly asks for directors
to consider their employees, environment, customers or suppliers, nor disclosure of nonfinancial
information unless it is “material”, which the SEC struggles to define. The FCA solved the standardization problem by adopting a widely-used international standard, the TCFD, that specifies
relevant information and appropriate accompanying metrics. Even though the CFD Regulation
only came into force in April 2022 and proposed SEC regulation is still pending, differences in
ESG scores of US and UK firms should still be observed due to the current state of their regulatory landscapes.
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Table 2. United Kingdom Legislation
Current Disclosure Regulations
(applies to large firms, banks, insurance companies, traded companies and firms with £500 million in turnover)

Companies Act 2006 Amendments — The
Companies (Strategic Report) (Climate-related
Financial Disclosure) Regulations 2022

Item Summary

Section 172.1 “Duty to promote the success of the
company”

“A director of a company must […] have regard
(amongst other matters) to—
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long
term,
(b) the interests of the company's employees,
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the
community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the
company.”

Section 417. “Contents of directors’ report: business
review” (items 1, 3, 5, and 6)

“(1) Unless the company is entitled to the small companies exemption, the directors' report must contain
a business review.”
“(3) The business review must contain—
(a) a fair review of the company's business,
and
(b) a description of the principal risks and
uncertainties facing the company.”
“(5) In the case of a quoted company the business
review must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position
of the company's business, include—
(a) the main trends and factors likely to aﬀect
the future development, performance and
position of the company's business; and
(b) information about—
(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company's business on the environment),
(ii) the company's employees, and
(iii) social and community issues,
including information about any policies of
the company in relation to those matters and
the eﬀectiveness of those policies […]”
“(6) The review must, to the extent necessary for an
understanding of the development, performance or
position of the company's business, include—
(a) analysis using financial key performance
indicators, and
(b) where appropriate, analysis using other
key performance indicators, including information relating to environmental matters and
employee matters […]”
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VI. Comparing US and UK Firms With ESG Metrics
The three tables below compare the environmental (E) and social (S) scores awarded to
publicly listed firms in three major industries in the United States and the United Kingdom.
While not without its limitations, these tables show that within these industries, UK firms outperform US competitors in the environmental and social pillars of ESG. This is the result of more
stringent disclosure regulation in the United Kingdom which has made UK-based firms more
socially responsible than those based in the US.
All environmental and social scores were sourced from Refinitiv, an American-British
provider of financial market data. The governance (G) pillar was omitted from the score because
Refinitiv’s benchmark was country of incorporation.2 The purpose is to observe scores within
industries where the industry average is the benchmark and the variation is country of incorporation. Thus, only the environmental and social pillars are provided to avoid bias that may result
from a combined ESG score. For both the United States and the United Kingdom, three major
industries were chosen—banking services, oil and gas, and specialty retailers. Within the industries are ten publicly-listed firms, five for each country of incorporation. The firms listed are the
top five largest firms in the US and UK by market capitalization. Individual environmental and
social scores are provided for each firm, as well as the calculated averages (mean).

A. Environmental (E) and Social (S) Scores in Three Major Industries
Table 3 compares US and UK firms within the banking services industry. The total market capitalization for the top five firms US amounts to $1.151 trillion, and $268.95 billion for the
2

For a description of Refinitiv’s ESG data methodology, please see: https://www.refinitiv.com/en/sustainable-finance/esg-scores
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UK. The average (mean) environmental (“E”) and social (“S) scores for US firms is 79.2 and
78.6 out of 100 possible points respectively for the United States, and 83.6 and 83.4 for the United Kingdom. Table 2 compares firms in the oil and gas industry. With a total market capitalization of $934.26 billion, US firms received an average environmental score of 63.6 and a social
score of 64.8. The top five UK oil and gas companies have a combined market capitalization of
$268.95 billion. These firms earned an average of 70.6 points for their environmental score and
82 for their social score. Finally, Table 3 compares scores in the specialty retailers industry. The
total US market capitalization is $169.37 billion, whereas the UK total is $22.09 billion. The UK
environmental average was 62.4 points, 11.4 points higher than the US. The US averaged 64.2
for its social score, or .8 points higher than the UK.
In every industry, the UK firms earn higher environmental scores. It also outperforms the
US in social factors except for in the specialty retailers industry, where it trailed the US by .8
points. Overall, the UK has a clear advantage over the US, which this paper argues is attributed
to the UK government’s regulation on ESG disclosure. Not only does the UK fare better in social
and environmental factors, but it manages this despite a comparatively low total market capitalization in all industries. It has been argued that firms with higher market capitalization could
mean that more resources can be dedicated to more comprehensive ESG reports, pushing their
averages upward (Kotsantonis and Serafeim 2019, 11). They also have greater capacity to allot
resources to improve ESG factors. As discussed in previous sections, the United States does not
currently have compulsory disclosure rules unless it is “material”. The UK, by contrast, has a
long history of good corporate governance practices into the business community and more recently has been phasing in specific nonfinancial disclosure requirements under the CFD Regula-
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tions in conjunction with the TCFD recommendations. Because data collected by Refinitiv is
sourced from what is publicly disclosed, information is bound by what firms choose to report.
This is especially true for the voluntarily disclosed information from the US, but this is not the
case with the UK firms who have been obligated to report on environmental and social factors
under the Companies Act 2006. Even with the advantages of high market capitalization and voluntary disclosure, UK firms still managed to outperform their US counterparts.
Governance factors were excluded because the data provider used the country and not the
industry average as a benchmark. According to Refinitiv’s website, “best governance practices
are more consistent within countries” (Refinitiv n.d.). Despite this discrepancy, ESG ratings that
include the governance metric are provided front-and-center, so those doing investment research
within industries are not entirely aware of how the governance factor skews the overall score.
Although it would have been preferable to include the combined ESG scores, the argument can
be made that climate and social factors are of higher importance because there are plenty of laws
already in place that focus on firm’s corporate governance. Improving on the data shown in this
section would require systemic changes to ESG data management. For example, it is likely that
the environmental and social scores shown in this section may conflict with data sourced from
another provider despite the data originating from the source publicly available sources because
there is no standardization or agreement on methodology among providers. This is, in part, due
to lack of standardization. These widespread problems are explicated further in the next section.
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Table 3. Banking Services Industry
United States

Company

Market Capitalization

Environment (E)
Score

Social (S) Score

JPMorgan Chase &
Co.

$410.84B

82

86

Bank of America

$350.84B

86

87

Wells Fargo

$200.01B

81

82

Citigroup, Inc

$109.56B

92

77

U.S. Bancorp

$80.16B

55

61

Total: $1.151T

Average: 79.2

Average: 78.6

United Kingdom

HSBC

$140.15B

87

72

Lloyds Banking
Group PLC

$43.7B

87

80

NatWest Group
PLC

$32.72B

63

84

Barclays PLC

$32.19B

91

86

Standard Chartered
PLC

$20.78B

90

95

Total: $268.95B

Average: 83.6

Average: 83.4
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Table 4. Oil & Gas Industry
United States
Market Capitalization

Environment (E)
Score

Social (S) Score

ExxonMobil

$348.72B

83

65

Chevron

$315.13B

80

86

ConocoPhillips

$136.32B

70

77

EOG Resources Inc

$71.90B

44

46

Pioneer Natural Resources

$62.19B

41

50

Total: $934.26B

Average: 63.6

Average: 64.8

Company

United Kingdom
Shell

$207.68B

93

92

BP

$96.24B

92

87

Energean PLC

$2.83B

61

75

Cairn Energy PLC

$1.45B

61

76

Serica Energy PLC

$1.43B

46

80

Total: $309.63B

Average: 70.6

Average: 82
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Table 5. Specialty Retailers Industry
United States
Market Capitalization

Environment (E)
Score

Social (S) Score

O’Reilly Automotives, Inc.

$48.14B

13

35

Autozone, Inc.

$44.39B

52

75

Tractor Supply Co.

$27.09B

82

71

Best Buy Co., Inc.

$23.93B

78

80

Ulta Beauty, Inc.

$21.82B

30

60

Total: $169.37B

Average: 51

Average: 64.2

Company

United Kingdom
JD Sports Fashion
PLC

$10B

65

46

Frasers Group PLC

$4.33B

61

50

Dunelm PLC

$2.91B

71

66

WH Smith PLC

$2.48B

57

84

Pets at Home
Group PLC

$2.37B

58

71

Total: $22.09B

Average: 62.4

Average: 63.4
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B. Limitations of ESG Factors as a Metric of CSR
Higher consumer expectations and investor demands coupled with lax regulation entice
firms to partake in greenwashing, or “positive communication” about what is actually “poor environmental performance” (Delmas and Burbano 2011, 65). Deutsche Bank’s asset manager,
DWS, triggered an investigation over allegations of greenwashing (Goldschmidt and Frankl
2022). The whistleblower was former Chief Sustainability Officer Desiree Fixler, who voiced her
concerns to the board regarding “highly flawed” ESG claims made by the company “because it
relied upon outdated technology and used ESG assessments provided by a range of external rating suppliers” (Miller, et al. 2021). Publicity over the matter prompted German authorities to raid
the Frankfurt office of Deutsche Bank, followed by the termination of CEO Asoka Wöhrmann.
Fixler’s primary concern was over misleading claims that ESG integration was applied to €459
billion of DWS’s €793 billion portfolio assets with no reliable way to measure the impact of
funds. She was tipped off by DWS’s scoring system sourced by third party data which awarded
Wirecard a high ESG rating despite its entanglement in accounting fraud that ultimately led to its
insolvency. The scandal encompasses the regulatory and data management hurdles that have
made ESG investment a nebulous endeavor.
The DWS greenwashing case was a matter not of disclosure abstention, but quality. According to an interview with Fixler, her concerns over false and misleading statements did not
persuade Mr. Wöhrmann, who was convinced of DWS’s status as an ESG leader according to
industry analyses. It did not seem to matter that these analyses had DWS itself as the data source.
DWS’s own ESG scoring criteria with data provided from a third party awarded German fintech
firm and DWS investment Wirecard the second-highest governance (G) score and gave Amazon
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the lowest. At the time, Wirecard was in the midst of a massive accounting fraud scandal. DWS
exemplifies the real effects of data mismanagement and is not an isolated case. An OECD report
on ESG investing diagnoses faulty reporting as a combination of “the promulgation of different
approaches, data inconsistencies, lack of comparability of ESG criteria and rating methodologies,
as well as inadequate clarity over how ESG integration affects asset allocation” (OCED 2021, 3).
The below chart from the OCED report (figure 2) illustrates the correlation spread of ESG scores
for three major providers tracking S&P 500 companies.

Figure 3. S&P ratings correlation for different providers

Improving correlations in ESG ratings across providers is not an impossible task. Much
can be gleaned from credit ratings agencies. Moody’s and S&P’s credit ratings have a correlation
of .90, compared with MSCI’s and Sustainalytics’ ESG ratings which have a correlation of .30
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(El-Hage 2021 369). The discrepancy can be traced back to standardization of financial disclosures and the consistency of data throughout the industry (369). With a selection of 50 random
Fortune 500 companies across sectors, Kotsantonis and Serafeim (2022) contextualize data inconsistency by listing the various terminology and metrics employed to describe employee health
and safety. If one firm measures “number of accidents with fatal consequences” with a number
unit, another will employ a percentage of “injury rate” as a metric (5). Not only does this make
comparing two firms within the same industry difficult, but also raises the question of how to
create standards across industries to avoid bias. Employee injury rates may be higher in infrastructure companies than tech firms, so comparing companies in different industries would
produce misleading perceptions about their ESG scores. One solution is to assign benchmark
standards for peer groups by determining an optimal range in a given industry. Universal benchmarks are also an option. In the case of “E” factors, for example, scientific standards can offer a
benchmark of total GHG emissions per industry to keep the global temperature increase under 2
degrees Celsius (8). As disclosure, voluntary or otherwise, becomes widespread, the role of government mandates should take the opportunity to consider resolving standardization and data
consistency issues. Otherwise, as with DWS, companies will undoubtedly manipulate data to
promote their own reputation and protect investments.

VIII. Conclusion
The European stakeholder model is often held in contrast with the Anglo-American
shareholder model. As their names suggest, the former includes stakeholders in their corporate
governance model whereas the latter prioritizes shareholders. The United Kingdom is uniquely
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situated somewhere in between the two, despite its misleading inclusion under the Anglo-American model. A key element that distinguishes UK firms from their American counterpart is due to
the varying degrees of regulations enforced by their financial authorities—the SEC and the FCA,
respectively. Perhaps ironically, disclosure requirements by the FCA under the Companies Act
2006 derived from the recommendations of committees formed by British corporate leaders
themselves throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Amendments made to the Act to include the
Companies (Strategic Report) (Climate-related Financial Disclosure) Regulations 2022 added the
requirement for 1,300 of the largest UK companies, or firms with over 500 employees or 500
million in turnover, to disclose climate-related risks in accordance with an international reporting
standard, the TCFD. Although the new disclosure rules went into force April 2022, the extent to
which the original Act required stakeholder thinking from company’s corporate leaders under the
“Director’s Duties” and accountability in the form of the “Business Review” significantly outweighs the SEC’s comparatively sparse Regulation S-K. The SEC does not require the consideration of stakeholders, and the degree to which environmental financial risk must be disclosed is
underreported and unenforced. The impact of regulation stringency is observed in the ESG ratings of US and UK firms across industries. The top five UK corporations by market capitalization among the oil and gas, specialty retail, and banking services industries outperform their
American equivalents in the environmental and social factors of ESG scores. These results suggest the effectiveness of disclosure regulation and demonstrated a response to the government’s
ambitious intention of becoming the first G20 country to mandate climate-related disclosure—
which it has since achieved (Beknounou 2021).
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The power of ESG ratings is in its ability to hold firms accountable to their claims of corporate responsibility. Its genesis signals an ideological shift of the corporate role in society. The
main purpose of business can no longer center around shareholder value and profit maximization, upheld by the current iteration of the shareholder model. It must answer to a wider constituency—the environment, employees, consumers, suppliers, communities—those who have
stakes, not shares, in a company. Before the advent of ESG scores, corporations could more easily boast their strategic pivot to a more stakeholder-friendly business model without penalization
for lack of follow-through. ESG scores grant not only potential investors but also stakeholders
the ability to track environmental, social and corporate governance elements of a firm and compare it with the firm’s claims and goals. Instead of relying on corporate mission statements, empty promises and tailored annual reports, the quantitative potential of ESG scores makes poor corporate responsibility transparent, making it difficult for them to conceal or explain away their
behavior.
The promise of ESG scoring, however popular, is eclipsed by poor standardization and
disparate methodologies among rating providers, which can be addressed with improved regulation. The United Kingdom’s FCA has resolved the standardization problem by requiring that
firms report with the guidelines under the TCFD. The SEC, by contrast, has not set reporting
standards nor guidance, concerned with authoritative overreach should they enforce disclosure
that is not financially material. ESG has become so broad that the agency frets over requiring
disclosure for nonmaterial factors. Change may be on the horizon: to achieve clarity, the SEC has
recently sought public comment on what climate-related issues are material to investors. Upcoming proposals will seek disclosure from certain investment advisors and firms regarding their
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ESG investments (SEC 2022b). UK financial enforcement agencies in comparison do not seem
to experience as much debate about the materiality question because stakeholder considerations
are more engrained in corporate culture and law.
Shareholder primacy is alive and well in the SEC as the new proposals are framed as an
obligatory response to shareholder concerns, conspicuously failing to mention those of stakeholders. Instead of proposals that are framed around the need to encourage sustainability in the
politically risky embrace of the risk of climate change, the SEC is motivated by their obligation
to “inform and protect” investors after an uptick in public greenwashing scandals (SEC 2022a).
These proposals also notably come on the heels of the United Kingdom’s own disclosure rules,
an indication of how the SEC drags its feet on corporate responsibility until the competitive edge
of regulated ESG reporting becomes apparent. Since the installment of the UK’s Companies Act
2006, there was a requirement that directors include stakeholders in their strategy because it is
seen as integral to the financially success of a business, followed by reporting on how they address these stakeholder needs in the Business Review. The amended Act is an expansion of these
requirements to enforce a particular focus on climate risk and mitigation.
The need for higher quality disclosure from firms cannot be understated. They reduce uncertainty in the market, provide tools to investors to make informed decisions, ensures transparency on firm’s financial decisions and prevents window dressing (Corporate Finance Institute
2021). As the ESG scores of firms become more important to investor decisions and the stringency of regulation on firms to provide high quality disclosure, the more likely they will pivot to
improve and expand sustainable business practices.
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